Bangladesh’s economy is facing renewed pressure from global geopolitical tensions and commodity market disruptions, with risks of elevated inflation, slower growth and mounting fiscal strain, according to Eric Robertsen, global head of research and chief strategist at Standard Chartered.

In an interview with The Daily Star, Robertsen said financial markets appear “overly optimistic” about a swift resolution of the ongoing Gulf tensions and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global energy supplies.

If shipping resumes soon, it could take weeks or months for oil, gas and petrochemical supply chains to normalise, prolonging price pressures worldwide, Eric Robertsen said
He added that even if shipping resumes soon, it could take weeks or months for oil, gas and petrochemical supply chains to normalise, prolonging price pressures worldwide.

“Even when the Strait reopens, it will take time for exports to normalise and for supply chains to stabilise,” he said, adding that such shocks typically leave behind persistent economic damage across vulnerable economies.

He explained that governments tend to follow a predictable policy response during commodity crises, starting with subsidies to cushion consumers and businesses, followed by price caps, rationing and, in some cases, more aggressive interventions.

“What we have seen in this crisis is that many economies, particularly in Asia, have moved through all these steps very quickly,” he said, adding that such measures come at a high fiscal cost.

“There will be a negative impact on fiscal balances as governments step in to support their economies,” he added.

Robertsen also flagged rising risks of stagflation -- a combination of high inflation and weak growth, particularly for emerging economies like Bangladesh.

“The inflation impact is immediate in a commodity shock, but the hit to growth comes with a lag,” he said.

Bangladesh has been witnessing persistently high inflation for the last three years.

“Higher energy prices reduce disposable income and investment capacity, which ultimately weakens demand,” Robertsen said.

He cautioned that central banks face a difficult balancing act in such an environment.

“If policy tightening happens too early or too aggressively, it could worsen the growth outlook,” he said.

However, he noted a key relief factor in the current crisis: the absence of a sharp appreciation of the US dollar.

“This has not turned into a currency crisis, which is extraordinarily good news for central banks,” he said.

About the global outlook, Robertsen highlighted four key risks for emerging economies: higher inflation, weaker growth, potential policy missteps and deteriorating fiscal balances.

“For the next two quarters, there is a need to build a higher risk premium into both market expectations and economic forecasts,” he said.

He also pointed to a longer-term structural shift in the global economy.

“We are moving into a world where control over commodities becomes both an economic and geopolitical tool,” he said, citing recent examples of export restrictions on energy products and critical inputs.

“One of the key lessons is the importance of maintaining strategic reserves of oil and gas,” he said. “Many countries have learned the hard way that they were underprepared.”

As a result, he expects global energy prices to remain structurally higher even after the current crisis subsides.

Naser Ezaz Bijoy, the chief executive officer of Standard Chartered Bangladesh, said in the same interview that Bangladesh’s ongoing economic challenges have been building over several years.

“Bangladesh’s current challenges did not begin with the war. They started during Covid-19, followed by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which created foreign currency pressures,” he said.

“There was a strong expectation that after the political transition, investment would pick up and economic activity would accelerate,” Bijoy said. “However, fresh external disruptions have continued to weigh on the outlook.”

He stressed that limited fiscal capacity remains a core constraint.

“Our tax-to-GDP ratio is weak, and revenue collection has been consistently low,” he said, warning that this leaves the country with less room to respond to shocks.

Government decisions to adjust administered prices, particularly in energy, are also adding to cost pressures.

“The government initially deferred price adjustments due to political sensitivities, but ultimately had little choice but to implement them,” he said, adding that such measures would inevitably affect both inflation and the cost of doing business.

At the same time, he emphasised that ensuring an uninterrupted energy supply is more critical than keeping prices low.

Bijoy also pointed to setbacks in external financing discussions. “The IMF negotiations did not progress as expected, which is another hurdle,” he said, adding that the issue would require high-level policy attention.

On the external sector, Bijoy said export performance has weakened in recent months, particularly in Europe.

“The decline in exports began around August,” he said, attributing it to softer demand, higher costs and intensifying competition from countries such as China and India.

Buyers are also changing sourcing strategies.

“They are increasingly diversifying and consolidating orders with larger suppliers who are better equipped to meet sustainability standards and manage risks,” he said.

Despite the slowdown, Bijoy does not foresee a sharp downturn. “We are seeing a modest dip in exports, around 4.5 percent, which may reach 5 to 5.5 percent. It is not a catastrophic situation,” he said.

Picture a garment factory in Ashulia on a Tuesday morning. Machines hum, deadlines loom, and a buyer waits on a shipment. Then the power cuts out. The generator kicks in. Diesel is expensive and polluting. The factory absorbs the cost and carries on. This is not a crisis. This is Tuesday. Bangladesh’s energy crisis is the “common cold” of the RMG sector: chronic, underestimated and quietly debilitating. Painful, yet rarely dramatic enough to force action. The prescription is known, and the reforms are within reach, but the cost of inaction is no longer theoretical. What was once a logistical headache has become an existential threat.

On the factory floor, reality is harsher. Chronic gas shortages idle machines, delay shipments and raise costs. Global buyers are asking tougher questions about carbon footprints. With only 5.24 percent of installed capacity coming from renewables, we are not merely missing targets; we are risking competitiveness in a market that rewards reliability and sustainability. The country aims to generate 40 percent of its electricity from clean sources by 2041. Yet, of 32,345 MW total capacity, renewables account for just 1,695 MW. In more than a decade, the renewable share has risen by barely 3 percent, while investment has continued to favour fossil fuels. The energy mix is also unbalanced. About 82.7 percent of renewable capacity comes from solar, with minimal contributions from wind and hydro. Limited diversification leaves the grid exposed to supply and price shocks.

Industry is already paying the price. Gas shortages, often exceeding 1,300 MMCFD, mean factories receive well below the required fuel. To keep production lines running, many rely on diesel generators. That raises costs and erodes margins already squeezed by currency depreciation and global price competition. Energy insecurity is making Bangladeshi goods more expensive, precisely when buyers demand lower prices. The greater risk lies in compliance. The EU, our largest export market, is tightening environmental standards. Buyers increasingly link orders to carbon intensity.

Waiting until 2030 is not an option. Four shifts are urgent. First, enable private power. A Merchant Power Plant framework should allow producers to sell directly to large industries at market rates. The policy must be bankable and free of excessive open access tariffs. RMG hubs should be able to sign long-term power purchase agreements with solar and wind developers. Second, modernise the grid. The transmission and distribution network was not designed for variable renewable generation. Scaling up clean energy requires smart grid investment, faster net metering rollout and a clear modernisation roadmap with financing and timelines.

Third, remove fiscal barriers. The FY2025-26 budget cut import duties on solar panels and inverters to 1 percent, but mounting structures still face duties of 58.6 percent and battery storage remains heavily taxed. Duty relief must extend to all essential components so that fiscal policy aligns with national energy goals. Fourth, mobilise green finance. Bangladesh needs up to $980 million annually until 2030 to meet renewable targets, several times the current annual investment of $238 million. The Tk 200 crore single borrower cap under the Green Transformation Fund is too small for utility-scale projects. Developing a liquid green bond market and securing risk guarantees from development partners would help attract investment at scale.

The textile and RMG sectors must be central to energy policy. Policies detached from factory realities will fail. The priority must shift from announcements to implementation. Renewable energy is no longer a distant aspiration or a branding exercise. It is an industrial necessity. If we do not accelerate the transition now, we risk leaving our most vital sector behind as global trade shifts towards low-carbon production.

The writer is a former director of BGMEA and additional managing director at Denim Expert Ltd

Economist Rehman Sobhan today (19 April) said Bangladesh's loan defaulters have become embedded in the political system and are now creating barriers to financial and institutional reforms.

"Loan defaulters have become part of the political structure. They themselves are obstructing reforms. So the problem is no longer person-specific, it is structural," he said on the final day of the three-day 9th South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (Sanem) Annual Economists' Conference in Dhaka.

"Reform is not merely about passing laws, but a continuous process requiring implementation, enforcement and measurable outcomes," he added at the session titled "Romancing the Reform: The Bangladesh Story", held in Dhaka today.

Sobhan said many reform efforts fail because governments do not follow through after legislation. "The first step of reform is enacting laws, followed by building the necessary administrative framework, ensuring proper enforcement and finally evaluating results."

The session was moderated by Sanem Executive Director Selim Raihan. The keynote paper was presented by CPD Distinguished Fellow Debapriya Bhattacharya, while former Finance Secretary and former Comptroller and Auditor General Mohammad Muslim Chowdhury served as designated discussant.

Debapriya said Bangladesh has pursued multiple reforms since independence but progress has been slowed by what he termed a "kleptocratic legacy" of corruption, misuse of public resources, weakened institutions and collusion among political, bureaucratic and business elites.

He said reforms often fail due to weak political ownership, poor implementation capacity, vested interests, lack of consultation, corruption, financing constraints and weak accountability.

Referring to the interim government, he said despite strong rhetoric, it failed to establish a coherent reform framework, lacked an integrated economic vision and did not create a real-time system for citizens to monitor progress.

Banking sector at center of crisis

Debapriya said the banking sector has become one of the clearest examples of how reform plans are derailed during implementation. He said rising non-performing loans (NPLs) are weighing heavily on the economy, while repeated attempts to restructure weak banks have been blocked by political resistance.

"The government has finally disclosed the names of major defaulters. But the real question is what to do with banks that have effectively collapsed," he said.

He also criticised amendments to the Bank Resolution Act, saying the changes created an opportunity for former owners of failed banks to regain influence by injecting a relatively small amount of money.

"This is seen as the comeback of oligarchs in a new form, with political patronage," he said, warning that such policy reversals send the wrong signal when depositors and investors need confidence.

He also criticised overlapping administrative control in the sector, saying governance reforms have been delayed for too long. "Good intentions are not enough. If banking reforms are delayed again, the cost to the economy will be much higher," he warned.

However, he welcomed promises of greater central bank autonomy, stronger supervision, action against defaulters and depositor protection, but questioned whether those commitments would be implemented.

Reform needs political commitment

Rehman Sobhan said political parties make major reform promises during elections, but it remains unclear whether they have the leadership or commitment to deliver them.

He said past reforms succeeded only when they had strong public support, citing the Six-Point Movement as an example of a widely backed reform agenda.

He added that such mobilisation is now weak, with parties failing to effectively communicate manifestos to voters. "In many cases, even party members do not properly know their own manifesto," he said.

Questioning the policy debate culture, Sobhan asked how many commentators have direct government experience, arguing that reform cannot be fully understood without working inside the state. "Without that experience, it is hard to know who supports reform, who resists it, and why it fails," he said.

Recalling his time at the Planning Commission, he said passing reform laws was not the main challenge.

Using police reform as an example, he said success should be measured by outcomes in practice. If accountability mechanisms are introduced, their effectiveness must be tested over time by citizens and journalists, he said. "That would be the real test of reform," he added.

Sobhan said many reform proposals promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are not new, but have been discussed for decades under successive governments.

According to him, governments often show limited progress to unlock loan disbursements, while development partners also have an interest in showing money has been spent.

"What actually happens in the long run is rarely examined," he said.

Need for performance budgeting

Sobhan said he has repeatedly proposed performance-based budgeting to show citizens what outcomes are achieved through public spending. "At present, we only see expenditure figures, with little analysis of results," he said.

Referring to health and education, he said allocations are often underutilised even as complaints persist over inadequate budgets. "If allocated money is not spent properly, where is the real problem?" he asked.

Citing India, Sobhan said major reforms such as the right to food, education and work were driven by strong citizen movements. In Bangladesh, he said civil society remains fragmented and unable to build unified pressure for large-scale reform.

He described the democratic process as the ultimate test of reform, calling for free, fair and inclusive elections. "A government becomes truly accountable when it accepts the people's verdict."

The World Bank-IMF Spring Meetings ended with more questions than answers for Bangladesh. There was no firm signal on the size or timing of external financing, no breakthrough on the stalled IMF programme, and no assurance that the expected $3.2 billion in budget support from the World Bank, ADB, AIIB, and Japan can be mobilised within the government's timeline. At a moment when tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are already unsettling global energy and freight markets, this ambiguity could not have come at a worse time.

Yet the government's post-Meeting narrative has been one of calm continuity. Officials insist the IMF programme is not off the table and that external financing will materialise once routine discussions conclude in the coming months. This confidence, however, sits uneasily alongside the fiscal choices now on the table: a record Tk9.3 trillion budget built on an ambitious revenue target that keeps the deficit deceptively modest as a share of GDP. The implicit message is that adjustment can wait – even as the global environment grows more hostile.

That assumption is increasingly difficult to sustain. Bangladesh sits at the wrong end of every transmission channel emanating from the Strait of Hormuz. Even a partial disruption pushes up oil prices, inflating the import bill and expanding subsidy requirements. Disruptions to Saudi and Qatari urea shipments raise fertilizer costs and threaten agricultural cycles. War-risk premiums on Gulf shipping routes increase freight costs for an import-dependent manufacturing base. Each additional dollar spent on fuel, fertiliser, and freight becomes a direct drawdown on already strained foreign exchange reserves.

Crucially, these pressures are not temporary. Even if the conflict were to de-escalate quickly, the lagged effects on prices, supply chains, and risk premiums are likely to persist for months. This is a shock that compounds over time – and it is arriving just as Bangladesh's policy credibility is beginning to fray.

The deeper problem is that the pressure is no longer one-sided. Bangladesh today finds itself caught between a shock it cannot control and policies it has been slow to adjust. The global environment is tightening from one end; policy inertia is tightening from the other. The result is a narrowing policy space – an economy squeezed from both directions.

This is why the stalled IMF programme matters far beyond its immediate financing value. Without an active IMF programme, Bangladesh loses more than access to disbursements – it loses its credibility anchor. And without that anchor, budget support from other multilaterals becomes harder to unlock, with IMF endorsement now effectively the gatekeeper of macroeconomic confidence. If these flows do not materialise, the consequences are immediate: a wider external financing gap, sharper import compression, rising inflation, and further pressure on reserves.

It is also important to recognise the constraints under which the current government is operating. Barely two months into office, it has been forced to navigate a fragile macroeconomic landscape while confronting a global shock that intensified within days of assuming power. Under such conditions, delays in advancing reforms are understandable.

What is harder to justify, however, is not inertia but reversal. The issue is not that reforms have yet to move forward – it is that some have not yet moved backward. The reintroduction of discretion in petroleum pricing, renewed exchange-rate management despite commitments to a market-based regime, and amendments to the bank resolution framework that reopen the door to previously discredited owners all signal a retreat from earlier reform commitments. Meanwhile, larger structural measures – particularly in tax and financial sector reform – remain stalled.

This mix of reversal and inertia creates a credibility problem at precisely the wrong moment. Backtracking signals unreliability; delays signal a lack of urgency. Together, they raise doubts about the government's willingness to adjust, keeping external financing on hold while the global shock intensifies.

The adjustment path itself is not complicated – but it is politically difficult. It begins with restoring exchange-rate credibility, because without that, reserves cannot be rebuilt and external balances cannot stabilise. It requires aligning interest-rate policy with genuine monetary tightening to contain inflation. It demands a shift in fiscal policy from expansionary optimism to targeted consolidation – anchored in realistic revenue expectations, rationalised subsidies, and prioritised expenditure. And it necessitates moving forward on long-delayed structural reforms, from tax administration and banking sector cleanup to energy pricing, port management, and state-owned enterprise governance.

Ultimately, macroeconomic adjustment is never neutral. When policy delays persist, the burden does not disappear – it shifts. Import compression translates into raw-material shortages for industry. A defended exchange rate erodes export competitiveness while diverting remittances into informal channels. Delayed energy pricing reforms inflate subsidies, crowding out social spending. In the absence of timely policy action, adjustment takes place through even higher inflation, stricter and more chaotic rationing, and slower growth – mechanisms that disproportionately affect those least able to absorb the shock.

Bangladesh is now operating in a dangerously exposed position: caught between a volatile global environment, a stalled IMF programme, and a fiscal stance that assumes the storm will pass. But the world is tightening, not easing. External conditions are becoming less forgiving, not more.

The government may have had limited time – but the direction of travel is already visible.

The war delivered the shock, but the distribution of pain is being decided at home. Without timely and credible reforms, the burden of adjustment will not be shared evenly – it will cascade downward, onto households, workers, and small businesses. That is the real cost of delay: not just macroeconomic strain, but a quieter, more unequal adjustment that unfolds as policy continues to look the other way.

The capital market in Bangladesh faces persistent problems with trust. IPO fraud and manipulation continue despite reforms, undermining investor confidence and impeding economic growth. Long-term stability and national development are at stake.

The nation has learned painful lessons. An estimated $27 billion in market value—roughly 22 percent of GDP at the time—was destroyed by the crashes of 1996 and, more catastrophically, 2010–2011. Millions of investors suffered losses, leaving social repercussions that still shape public perception of the stock market. The same structural flaws remain more than a decade later.

Recent enforcement data highlight the severity. The Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) fined individuals nearly Tk 1,488 crore in the past 18 months for manipulation and misconduct. Yet only a fraction has been recovered due to lengthy legal battles. This gap between punishment and accountability sends the wrong signal: wrongdoing is costly on paper but not in practice.

Systemic weaknesses drive these failures—coordinated trading through omnibus accounts, abuse of placement shares, diversion of IPO proceeds, and lack of real-time surveillance. Bangladesh’s market capitalization remains low, around 6 percent of GDP in mid-2025, compared to over 100 percent in deeper, better-run markets. This underdevelopment hampers financing for infrastructure, SMEs, and industrial growth—key to Vision 2041 and the “Smart Bangladesh” agenda.

Globally, fraud persists but is increasingly managed with technology. Scandals like Enron and Madoff spurred regulators to adopt AI for real-time surveillance. Exchanges are also testing blockchain-based settlement systems that are faster, cheaper, and more transparent. Emerging economies such as India and Brazil have embraced digital reforms, strengthening disclosure, monitoring, and enforcement.

Bangladesh, however, still relies on manual oversight and fragmented data. In an era of cyber-enabled scams, this is insufficient. For a small, fragile market, each crisis inflicts disproportionate damage and deters investors. Modern technology offers a transformative opportunity.

Blockchain can fundamentally change IPOs and securities transactions. In a permissioned blockchain, every transaction is permanently recorded, time-stamped, and visible to authorized participants. Smart contracts can automate IPO rules—ensuring funds are released only when verified conditions are met, allocations follow transparent logic, and lock-up periods cannot be bypassed. Immutable records eliminate manipulation.

AI complements this as a real-time watchdog. It can analyze trading patterns, detect unusual movements, and identify coordinated networks far faster than traditional monitoring. Leading exchanges report fewer false alarms and quicker enforcement after adopting AI-driven systems.

Together, blockchain and AI create a powerful regulatory architecture: blockchain ensures data integrity, AI provides intelligence and early warning. Such systems could flag suspicious IPO activity, trigger halts during abnormal behaviour, and deliver regulators immediate, evidence-based alerts. Privacy-preserving technologies safeguard data.

For Bangladesh, implementation can be phased. Pilot IPOs integrated with the central securities depository would allow testing and scaling. International experience shows such reforms reduce fraud risk, shorten settlement cycles, improve liquidity, and restore confidence.

A regulatory sandbox led by BSEC, with Bangladesh Bank, could test blockchain-based e-IPO systems and AI surveillance. Capacity building is vital—training regulators, auditors, and intermediaries to oversee data-driven systems. Collaboration among exchanges, the depository, banks, and technology providers will be essential.

Implementation should begin with targeted pilots: blockchain-enabled IPOs and AI surveillance in the secondary market, before scaling. This gradual approach limits disruption while signaling decisive reform.

Bangladesh is well-positioned to leapfrog. High mobile penetration, a young tech-savvy population, and strong policy backing under the Smart Bangladesh Master Plan provide a solid foundation. While advanced economies refined systems over decades, late adopters can now deploy mature technologies quickly.

The cost of inaction is clear: repeated scandals will cap growth, deter foreign investment, and push savings into informal channels. The benefits of action are equally clear: a transparent market that channels savings into productive investment, lowers risk premiums, and supports sustainable transformation.

Fraud is not inevitable—it is a governance problem that can be solved. By adopting blockchain and AI as core regulatory tools now, Bangladesh can protect investors, strengthen institutions, and become a regional leader in financial innovation. Decisive reform today will yield economic, social, and strategic dividends for decades.

The government needs to allocate more to education, health, and social protection in the upcoming budget, and ensure that the funds are properly utilised to create a better future for every child in the country, development specialists and donor agencies said yesterday.

Speaking at a roundtable, they pointed out that utilisation of development budgets in both sectors has hovered around 50 percent for at least two fiscal years. The discussion, regarding strengthening investment in social sectors in the upcoming budget, was jointly arranged by The Daily Star and Unicef with support from the European Union.

Md Ashiq Iqbal, social policy and economic specialist at Unicef, said in fiscal year 2024-25 (FY25), utilisation of the development budget of education was 47.4 percent while it was 9.8 percent in the health sector.

According to him, the underutilisation of funds pointed to significant room for efficiency gains. “Over 50 percent gain is possible for education and health within the existing envelope.”

But he stressed that efficiency alone would not close the gap, as overall investment remains critically low to begin with.

The social policy expert noted that Bangladesh’s spending on education is one of the lowest shares in the world -- just 1.5 percent of its GDP on education against a government target of 5 percent.

The gap between current and target investment is 70 percent, which has widened over the past decade, he added. “Significant budgetary steps are required to progressively reach the target.”

Health spending stands at 0.7 percent of GDP, also among the world’s lowest. “The same thing is happening in the social protection budget too.”

Iqbal depicted the consequences of the spending failure, citing child welfare data.

Some 6.5 percent of primary school-age children are out of school, he said, adding that attendance falls sharply after primary school while foundational skills improve but remain far too low. “Bangladesh’s primary education progress is in stagnation.”

The Unicef official also said, “serious” risks persist in public health.

Two in five children and one in 13 pregnant women show elevated blood lead levels. The neonatal mortality rate stands at 22 per 1,000. Nearly two-thirds of children aged 6 to 23 months live in food poverty, as social protection coverage shrank in recent times.

In fiscal year 2024-25 (FY25), utilisation of the development budget of education was 47.4 percent while it was 9.8 percent in the health sector
Iqbal welcomed the commitments made by the ruling BNP in its manifesto on education access and quality, child survival, and malnutrition.

He called for allocating at least 2 percent of GDP to quality and inclusive education of children, with increased funding for foundational learning and teacher development, and at least 1.5 percent of GDP for health, with ringfenced vaccine budgets and free medicine for the poor.

Prof Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir, finance adviser to the prime minister, said the government inherited an economy burdened with multiple problems, further aggravated by current global pressures.

He explained that with inflation persisting, the government could not adjust fuel prices and was instead focusing on proper utilisation of spending.

The official also said the government was moving toward a universal social protection system to eliminate inclusion errors, exclusion errors, and fragmentation with one card per family for service delivery.

In addition, he said, for the first time, farmers would also receive cards through scheduled banks, entitling them to multiple subsidies. The government hopes to reduce errors and create fiscal space through these initiatives.

The government was also focusing on transparency and accountability in spending, with budget implementation effectiveness and digitalisation of revenue collection among its priorities, Titumir added.

The PM’s adviser also flagged that conditions attached to loans taken by the previous government from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were creating pressure that “may not be child-friendly or women-friendly”.

Criticising the United Nations for reportedly not speaking out on these issues, he called for better coordination and harmonisation in the intergovernmental organisation.

Rana Flowers, country representative of Unicef Bangladesh, said she recognised that the government inherited an economy where debt obligations are rising, and economic uncertainties came from the global arena.

She pointed out that the situation demands figuring out how to use limited resources efficiently.

The Unicef official urged the government to focus on improving capital development, child education and social protection.

Rasheda K Choudhury, executive director of the Campaign for Popular Education, said education spending should be treated as an investment in human capital.

“If we curb corruption, if we curb violence against women and if we curb drug addiction, it will free up substantial funds for social sectors,” she said, urging the government to actively court non-resident Bangladeshis for support.

Prof Mustafizur Rahman, a distinguished fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue, said the government needs to prioritise its spending and draw up plans to adjust investment in the social sectors.

Gitanjali Singh, country representative of UN Women, called for higher social sector allocations alongside a tracking system to ensure expenditure efficiency.

She also urged the government to raise tax revenue and shift toward progressive taxation, given the constraints on fiscal space.

Prof Abu Eusuf, executive director of Research and Policy Integration for Development (RAPID), called on authorities to publish the actual education budget by subtracting the technology budget from it, and urged the reinstatement of the child budget.

He also asked for the social protection budget to be broken down clearly, separating pension obligations from other programmes.

Furthermore, the policy expert proposed establishing eight top-class hospitals -- one per division -- so that people do not need to travel to Dhaka for specialised care.

On revenue, he noted that tax exemptions amount to 6 percent of GDP and urged the government to widen the tax base without pressuring existing taxpayers.

Mahfuz Anam, editor and publisher of the Daily Star, said he has been covering child issues for many years as a journalist, and the same stories keep recurring.

While the country has made some advances, it remains far from where it needs to be, he added, urging all to use the newspaper to improve child rights issues.

Kishower Amin, programme manager of Public Financial Management, said revenue reform was essential, including reform of the revenue board and full digitalisation of tax systems.

Without higher revenue collection, she said, increases in health and education spending would not be possible.

Mosammat Ayesha Akther, deputy director of the National Academy for Educational Management of the Ministry of Education, Shumon Sengupta, Country Director of Save the Children in Bangladesh, Lole Valentina Lucchese, programme manager of Social Protection of EUD, and Stanley Gwavuya, Chief-SPEAR of Unicef, also talked at the event.

Bangladesh can no longer afford “surreal” budgets built on inflated projections and political convenience, warned eminent economist Debapriya Bhattacharya.

He urged the government to confront its fiscal realities through difficult but necessary reforms.

“Don’t make a surreal budget -- an illusory one that defies realities. Artificially inflated expenditures and income may be politically saleable at the moment, but everyone knows these numbers cannot be delivered,” he said.

“However unpalatable it may sound, the government does not have the luxury of fiscal profligacy. The guiding factor must be the government’s available fiscal space,” he said.

In an interview with The Daily Star, the distinguished fellow of the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) shared his perspectives on the government’s upcoming budget for the fiscal year 2026-27.

He outlined potential avenues for revenue mobilisation, flagged concerns over public expenditure, and stressed the need for a credible and transparent fiscal framework to navigate mounting economic pressures.

At the core of the upcoming budget lies a critical challenge: how to mobilise adequate revenue without overburdening taxpayers.

According to Debapriya, a significant portion of potential revenue is lost through tax exemptions.

“Income tax exemptions alone account for around 3 percent of GDP. If you add VAT and customs exemptions, total tax expenditures rise to about 6.8 percent,” he said, citing data from the National Board of Revenue (NBR).

But he cautioned against blanket removal.

“The priority should be rationalisation. We need to assess whether these exemptions are disproportionately benefiting certain business groups and whether they are actually improving productivity and competitiveness of the sector concerned,” he said.

Ensuring that small and medium enterprises receive adequate tax support should also be part of that review, he added.

Beyond tax dispensations, the government faces growing fiscal pressure from demand for subsidies and incentives.

“Subsidies account for about 1.8 percent of GDP, with a large share going to the power sector. There are also significant export and agricultural incentives, Debapriya said.

“When you combine tax expenditures, subsidies, and fiscal incentives, the total fiscal exposure reaches around 9 to 10 percent of GDP. Including contingent liabilities, it exceeds 12 percent. That is substantial for an economy which collects less than 7 percent of GDP as total revenue.”

To address the existing revenue gap, Debapriya stressed the importance of expanding the tax base. Out of 1.28 crore tax identification number (TIN) holders, less than 23 lakhs (18 percent) actually pay taxes.

“The principle should be low tax rates with high coverage,” he said. “We need to bring more people into the tax net rather than increasing the burden on a small group.”

He also highlighted the need to distinguish between taxable individuals and taxable income.

“Someone may be within the tax net but have little taxable income, while others with significant income remain under-taxed. That imbalance needs to be corrected.”

He suggested exploring new areas of taxation, including property and inheritance taxes.

“In most developed economies, inheritance tax is used to address intergenerational inequality. You cannot tackle inequality by taxing income alone; asset inequality is far greater in our country,” he said.

Asset recovery, particularly by bringing back stolen resources and making large defaulters pay, could also provide an additional source of revenue if pursued effectively, he added.

SHRINKING FISCAL SPACE

Debapriya warned that Bangladesh’s fiscal space is narrowing, as operating expenditures continue to rise. The newly elected government will have to prudently consider the recommendations made by the National Pay Commission 2025 under the interim government.

“Salaries, subsidies, and interest payments are consuming revenue budget,” he said.

“Debt stress is now emerging as a major macroeconomic challenge.” Currently, the debt servicing liabilities of the government -- domestic and external -- are almost double the amount of total public expenditure for health and education.

He noted that public expectations from the new government remain high. Some early measures based on electoral commitments may appear to be populist in nature. However, these initiatives are being rolled out in phases and remain relatively contained in fiscal terms, he added.

URGENCY OF TAX REFORMS

Debapriya stressed that delays in tax administration reform, particularly within the NBR, could undermine domestic revenue mobilisation.

“If the reform process is not completed quickly, especially the institutional restructuring, tax collection may suffer at a critical time,” he warned.

He pointed out that both revenue collection and public expenditure will peak during the last quarter (April-June) of the current fiscal year.

“Reducing human interaction, minimising discretionary power, and ensuring transparency through digital systems are essential for improving efficiency and accountability,” he said.

For Bangladesh, he concluded, the way forward lies in realism, discipline, and coherent policymaking.

“We often see policy contradictions-- where one measure offsets another. That reduces overall effectiveness,” he said. Thus, there is a need for consistency and coordination.

“The opportunity is still there,” he said. “But it is narrowing.”

The policy expert urged the finance minister to adopt a pragmatic but structured approach to fiscal reform, stressing the need for policymakers to look beyond immediate pressures.

“My suggestion is simple: take the hard path, but place it within a medium-term budgetary framework -- a three-year horizon. That way, people can be assured that short-term difficulties will lead to longer-term stability,” he said.

“You should not be overly concerned about what happens in just one year. The real focus should be on where the national economy would stand before the next national election, he observed.

Using an analogy, he explained the need for short-term restraint to enable long-term gains.

“If you want to make a long jump, you have to step back first, gather momentum, and then leap forward. This is that moment-- we may need to pull back now to create the space for consolidation and future growth.”

STALLED CAPITAL MARKET REFORMS

Debapriya pointed to the long-standing proposal of offloading shares of multinational companies (MNCs), state-owned banks and enterprises (SOEs) to deepen the capital market.

“This idea dates back to the former finance minister Saifur Rahman’s time, but implementation has been continuously aborted,” he said.

The interim government also gave instructions to bring in shares of profitable SOEs and multinational companies to the capital market. The government and the MNCs each were to offload at least 5 percent of their shares. “But to no avail.”

He attributed the failure to bureaucratic resistance, as officials often benefit from maintaining control over these entities. Offloading the shares would have given the capital market some positive vibes and, at the same time, generated some much-needed resources for the government.

On the expenditure side, he expressed concern over the effectiveness of public spending, particularly under the Annual Development Programme (ADP).

“Many projects are delayed, repeatedly revised, and suffer from poor feasibility studies,” he said.

“Protracted land acquisition process and deficient project management, epitomised by inappropriate project directors, are also common.” There are more than 1300 projects under the ADP, one-third of which are six to eleven years old.

He recommended forming a dedicated review body to weed out the “zombie projects” that have been continuing without meaningful progress.

“There is also a need to appoint skilled project directors and, where necessary, bring in professionals from outside the government,” he added.

Improving the quality of spending, he noted, would increase public trust and tax compliance.

Eight years ago on 22 March, Dhaka erupted in celebration. A colourful procession rolled out from Doyel Chattar, festooned with banners and buoyed by orchestra music. Balloons were released at Dhaka University.

Back then, LDC graduation was framed as a national triumph, a validation of governance, and, crucially, a legacy project of the now-ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

Today, that narrative is unravelling.

A newly released UN Graduation Readiness Assessment tells a far more sobering story: Bangladesh may have met the formal thresholds to graduate from the Least Developed Country category, but it remains structurally unprepared for what comes next.

And that distinction between eligibility and readiness is now at the heart of a critical policy reversal as the current government is looking to defer the graduation.

The illusion of readiness

The United Nations has long emphasised a simple but often ignored principle that graduating from LDC status is not just about crossing statistical thresholds. It is about ensuring that development gains are not reversed once international support mechanisms are withdrawn.

By that standard, Bangladesh's preparedness is deeply questionable.

The assessment identifies four core vulnerabilities that continue to define the economy: dependence on international support measures, weak trade diversification, limited domestic resource mobilisation, and acute exposure to climate risks.

Take domestic resource mobilisation for instance. Bangladesh's tax-to-GDP ratio remains among the lowest globally, severely limiting fiscal space. Even medium-term targets fall short of what is required for a lower-middle-income economy.

In practical terms, this means the state lacks the capacity to absorb shocks — whether from the loss of trade preferences, reduced concessional financing, or external volatility. And the economy is yet to recover from the turbulence it faced from 2022 to 2025.

The report states that weak revenue mobilisation is "one of the most binding preparedness gaps" in Bangladesh's transition.

A narrow economy in a changing world

If fiscal weakness is one pillar of vulnerability, export concentration is another.

Bangladesh's export success has been built overwhelmingly on a single sector — ready-made garments. Apparel accounts for over 80% of merchandise exports, with limited diversification even within the sector itself.

This model worked under LDC conditions, where preferential market access and policy flexibilities provided a cushion. But post-graduation, that cushion disappears.

The UN assessment warns that Bangladesh remains "anchored in a narrow export base and limited industrial upgrading", with low value addition and constrained pathways for diversification.

Upon graduation, preference erosion could translate into billions in lost exports, eroding competitiveness at a time when global markets are already tightening.

Economic growth specialist and COO of Rancon Infrastructure and Engineering Subail Bin Alam's assessment captures this risk with precision.

"For too long, the RMG sector has been our safety net, accounting for over 80% of our exports. However, the 'LDC Graduation' means we are about to lose Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) benefits, which could result in an estimated $8 billion in annual export losses. Beyond apparel, the export basket is dominated by low-complexity products, reflecting a pronounced capability gap and limited scope for adjacent diversification," he explained.

In other words, Bangladesh is attempting to graduate with an economic structure that still resembles that of an LDC.

A preparatory period lost to crisis

If the structural weaknesses are longstanding, the failure of preparation is more recent — and more damning.

The five-year preparatory period, granted by the UN to ensure a smooth transition, was meant to be a time of reform, coordination, and strategic planning. Instead, it became a period of crisis management.

The UN report notes that the past five years were "largely consumed by crisis management, economic stabilisation and political survival," rather than long-term preparation.

This is consistent with the government's own admission. In its letter to the UN Committee for Development Policy, Bangladesh acknowledged that the preparatory period "has not functioned as intended".

Global shocks played a role — the Covid-19 pandemic, the Ukraine war, tightening financial conditions. But domestic factors were equally significant: financial sector irregularities, policy rigidity, and ultimately, the political upheaval of August 2024.

The result is an economy entering 2026 with depleted reserves, high inflation, weak investment, and limited fiscal space.

As applied macroeconomist and Director of Sydney Policy Analysis Centre Jyoti Rahman puts it, "The economic landscape has been severely battered. Honestly, from an external perspective, it is clear the economy is caught in a long-term entanglement. We saw a total stagnation of private investment throughout 2025 following the July Uprising. We have entered 2026 facing deep economic uncertainty, exacerbated by global conflicts and an acute energy crisis."

He adds a crucial point, "The transition from LDC status is an inevitable and necessary milestone. However, the true challenge lies in our preparation."

That preparation, by most accounts, has been inadequate.

The cost of policy hubris

In retrospect, the problem was not the ambition to graduate. It was the politicisation of that ambition.

Under the previous Awami regime, LDC graduation was framed less as a technical process and more as a symbolic victory. The 2018 celebrations were not an isolated event — they reflected a broader narrative that equated eligibility with readiness.

That narrative discouraged caution.

"For too long, the RMG sector has been our safety net, accounting for over 80% of our exports. However, the 'LDC Graduation' means we are about to lose Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) benefits, which could result in an estimated $8 billion in annual export losses. Beyond apparel, the export basket is dominated by low-complexity products, reflecting a pronounced capability gap and limited scope for adjacent diversification."
Subail Bin Alam, economic growth specialist and COO, Rancon Infrastructure and Engineering

Economists, business leaders, and development practitioners had, for years, urged a more measured approach. After the Covid-19 shock and the 2022 dollar crisis, calls for deferral grew louder.

Yet these concerns were largely ignored.

When Bangladesh government finally requested 3 years deferral for LDC graduation in February, 2026, Dr Fahmida Khatun, the Executive Director of Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) told TBS, "In the international arena, such decisions of time extensions are not driven by emotion or political rhetoric, but rather based strictly on data, statistics, and measurable indicators."

The data, it now appears, was pointing in a different direction all along.

Why deferral makes economic sense

Against this backdrop, the current government's decision to seek a three-year deferral is a necessary recalibration. Especially given the looming economic crisis due to the ongoing Iran War.

First, time is needed to negotiate post-LDC trade arrangements.

BGMEA President Mahmudul Hasan Khan said, "New trade opportunities — such as Free Trade Agreements, Preferential Trade Agreements or Economic Partnership Agreements — may open up. But these agreements do not materialise overnight. They require careful preparation, technical analysis, and lengthy negotiations. If rushed, there is a risk of securing unfavourable terms or overlooking key national interests."

At the same time, macroeconomic stability must be restored.

Jyoti Rahman explained, "In the immediate term, the government's primary duty is to maintain macroeconomic stability. It is about managed stability rather than just obsessing over the absolute reserve figure."

Moreover, structural reforms must be accelerated — particularly in taxation, banking, and the investment climate. As Subail Bin Alam cautioned, "When banks are burdened by bad debt, they stop lending to the 'missing middle', the SMEs. We cannot build a modern economy if our entrepreneurs are forced to borrow at 14–16% interest rates while competing against global players who have access to capital at 4–5%."

The consequences of proceeding without adequate preparation are not hypothetical.

Loss of trade preferences could erode export competitiveness. Reduced concessional financing could strain public finances. Withdrawal of policy flexibilities could limit industrial policy options.

The UN assessment points out that these risks are compounded by Bangladesh's continued reliance on LDC-specific support measures and limited institutional capacity to manage their withdrawal.

In short, the country risks losing the benefits of LDC status before it has built the resilience required to operate without them.

This is why the report warns that graduation, under current conditions, could "disrupt development gains".

That is not a risk any responsible government should take.

What must be done next

Deferral, however, is not a solution in itself. It is an opportunity — one that must be used wisely. Over the years, the experts have pointed out the priorities. Now the necessary measures need to be taken to increase our preparedness.

"At this juncture, we need more than just a budget; we need a detailed roadmap. The government should use the upcoming budget to outline exactly how they plan to achieve their long-term growth targets," Jyoti Rahman said.

However the Awami regime portrayed it, LDC graduation was never meant to be a trophy. It was meant to be a transition. For too long, that distinction was blurred.

Today, the reality is unavoidable: Bangladesh is not yet ready to graduate in a way that is smooth, sustainable, and irreversible. The data says so. The experts say so. Even the government, implicitly, acknowledges it.

And in policymaking, that is often the hardest and most necessary step.

Shadique Mahbub Islam is a journalist.

Picture this: Dhaka, 9 February 2026. Three days before a national election, in a room sealed from public scrutiny, officials sign the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) with the United States.

No parliamentary debate. No press conference. No disclosure of terms.

Twenty-four hundred kilometres west, in New Delhi, textile exporters scan the leaked fine prints. Their conclusion: Bangladesh has locked itself into buying expensive American cotton in exchange for tariff access. Production costs will rise. Profit margins will shrink.

But the real story runs deeper.

Article 4.3 contains a sleeper clause: if Bangladesh signs any agreement with a "non-market-based country" — Washington's shorthand for China or Russia — the US can cancel all preferences overnight.

Bangladesh commits to supporting US actions to protect American economic security. Dhaka agrees to restrict the unauthorised exports of US-controlled items and develop export control systems with Washington.

This is not a trade agreement. This is a strategic straitjacket, tailored in the 12 days before an election, while the nation looked away.

The missing filter

Hossain Zillur Rahman's six-point memo to the new government is essential reading — a sharp domestic diagnostic on jobless growth, mesoeconomics, and effective compassion. He is right about the internal fractures. But the world outside has fractured too.

The global economy is no longer neutral. It has become a battlefield. Western economic warfare, supply chain decoupling, and the rise of a multipolar world have transformed every major economic decision into a geopolitical choice. A power plant is not just megawatts. A 5G contract is not just bandwidth. A trade deal is not just tariffs.

Bangladesh needs a seventh signal: a dual-filter framework embedded into governance. Every decision on export diversification, energy security, and digital infrastructure must pass two tests.

First, does it advance domestic economic goals? This is Rahman's framework.

Second, does it increase or decrease our strategic vulnerability in a fracturing world? This is the missing framework, and without it, competence alone will not steer us through the storm.

The 9 February deal through both filters

Apply this dual filter to the US-Bangladesh ART agreement.

Through the first lens, the deal offers duty-free access for approximately 2,500 products. Export volumes to the United States could rise from $8.7 billion to $12 billion within two years. On paper, this deal appears to advance national interests.

The second lens reveals a straitjacket. Tariff-rate quota volumes for apparel will be determined by US textile imports. Garments made using Indian, Brazilian or African cotton may not qualify for preferential access. Bangladesh's entire apparel value chain must pivot toward higher-cost US inputs.

Worse, sovereignty clauses restrict future foreign policy. Sign an agreement with Beijing that Washington deems harmful? The deal terminates. Purchase nuclear reactors from Russia or China? Explicitly prohibited. Pursue digital cooperation with non-Western partners? Restricted.

The agreement also locks Dhaka into purchasing $15 billion of American Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) over 15 years, plus commitments to buy 14 Boeing aircraft — a $3-4 billion decision made without consulting Biman's technical committee, which was still evaluating competing proposals from Airbus.

This is not economic policy. It is surrendering fiscal sovereignty.

Bangladesh needs a seventh signal: a dual-filter framework embedded into governance. Every decision on export diversification, energy security and digital infrastructure must pass two tests: first, does it advance domestic economic goals, and second, does it increase or decrease our strategic vulnerability in a fracturing world?

Export diversification beyond the cotton trap

Bangladesh's export basket remains heavily concentrated in a few sectors. Ready-made garments account for over 80% of earnings. Four markets — the European Union, the United States, Canada, and Japan — absorb 68% of exports. This is a single point of failure wrapped in cotton.

The Global South offers alternatives without strategic shackles. In January 2026, Bangladesh Bank announced cash incentives for 43 export categories, including light engineering, halal meat, leather goods, pharmaceuticals, and software-enabled services. The halal economy alone is projected to reach $10 trillion by 2030.

Local currency settlement mechanisms are reducing exposure to dollar volatility across Asia. About 90% of commerce among Brics nations is now settled in local currencies, up from roughly 65% two years ago.

The Brics Pay platform, presented at the October 2024 Kazan Summit, connects national payment systems — China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), India's Unified Payments Interface (UPI), Russia's System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), and Brazil's instant payment network PIX — enabling local-currency transactions via QR codes without intermediaries.

These are operational frameworks Bangladesh can study and adapt.

Energy security as geopolitical choice

Every power plant tells a story about whose technology a nation trusts. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, built with Russian technology, is expected to begin operations this year.

The Matarbari coal plant, developed with Japanese assistance, represents another model. The LNG terminals supplied by US and Qatari partners represent a third. Each carries different strategic implications and different exposure to sanctions.

Bangladesh must prioritise its energy security. The 9 February deal bars Bangladesh from purchasing nuclear reactors, fuel rods or enriched uranium from any country that 'jeopardises essential US interests', offering exceptions only for existing contracts. This is a pre-emptive strike against future energy choices.

In January 2026, the Ministry of Power submitted a 25-year master plan to Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, focusing on offshore gas exploration, LNG supply security, and hydrogen infrastructure. The plan projects electricity demand rising from 17 to 59 gigawatts by 2050, requiring investments exceeding $177 billion. Bangladesh must ensure its energy future remains its own to decide.

Digital infrastructure and data sovereignty

The twenty-first century's most valuable resource is data. The infrastructure that carries it — undersea cables, data centres and cloud platforms — is increasingly contested terrain.

The draft National AI Policy 2026-2030 explicitly emphasises "digital sovereignty", aiming to safeguard critical data and citizens' rights. A cornerstone is the development of a Bangla-based large language model to preserve cultural heritage and protect intellectual property from foreign exploitation.

The policy warns that automation may threaten up to 60.8% of garment sector jobs, affecting around 2.7 million workers.

Yet the 9 February deal commits Bangladesh to "permit the free transfer of data across trusted borders" and support a permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These provisions constrain Dhaka's ability to negotiate different data governance frameworks with other partners.

The emerging cooperation among Asean, China, and Gulf states on digital trade platforms offers an alternative model — built on connectivity rather than control. These frameworks do not require choosing against the West. They require building enough relationships that no single partner can dictate terms.

The seventh signal

Zillur Rahman's six signals provide a strong domestic foundation. But they assume a world that no longer exists. The seventh signal is this: Bangladesh's economic and foreign policy can no longer be separated. Every decision on export markets, energy partners, and digital infrastructure is simultaneously an economic calculation and a geopolitical commitment.

The new government must institutionalise this understanding. Create a National Economic Security Council bringing together trade, finance, energy, and foreign policy officials. Require strategic vulnerability assessments for every major international agreement. Task the central bank with a formal assessment of platforms like Brics Pay — not as alternatives to Western systems, but as complements that ensure the dollar is not the only option.

The choice before the BNP government is not between East and West. The choice is between accepting a straitjacket designed elsewhere and building enough relationships and enough strategic literacy that Bangladesh's future remains Bangladesh's to write.

Hossain Zillur Rahman is right: the start is grounded in optimism. But optimism without strategic clarity is just wishful thinking dressed in the national flag. The seventh signal must come now — before the next agreement is signed in secret, before the next straitjacket is tailored, before the next crossroads becomes a dead end.

Zakir Kibria is a Bangladeshi writer, policy analyst and entrepreneur based in Kathmandu, Nepal.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.

Qatar on Monday suspended its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) production following attacks on key operating facilities by Iran.

This suspension means Bangladesh, which has a long-term agreement with Qatar to supply LNG, will not get its much-needed fuel in this lean season. As a result the country will face heavy load shedding, since a significant portion of its gas-based power generation will not have adequate supply.

Bangladesh is heavily dependent on imported fuels to meet its energy needs. It imports various fuel oil, coal, LNG, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) worth around $5 billion annually because domestic gas and coal resources are very limited.

Lost opportunity

Bangladesh could have fared differently and better had the Yunus-led government not cancelled 31 renewable power projects totalling 3,300 megawatt capacity, mostly solar, with around 300MW wind and a small 25MW waste-to-energy project.

By now, around one third of these projects could have been generating electricity, reducing the impact of load shedding caused by impending LNG supply shortfall.

However, they were cancelled in September 2024, just one month after Muhammad Yunus assumed office. The government argued that these projects, signed under the Awami League through the controversial Quick Energy Supply (Special Provision) Act 2010, had not been awarded through competitive bidding.

The power tariffs under these projects ranged between 9.7 cents and 10.6 cents per kilowatt hour. The Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) and the investors criticised the cancellation, and the government's decision was challenged at the High Court. The court ruled that the projects had been signed in good faith and could therefore be condoned with a review option.

With Letters of Intent (LoIs), the power companies had already purchased or were in the process of purchasing lands for their projects. Land acquisition is the most difficult part for any such ventures.

Costly mistake

When companies were expecting final agreements, the then-energy adviser Fouzul Kabir Khan pushed for the cancellation of all LoIs. The government subsequently floated fresh tenders for renewable projects totalling more than 5,000MW.

Although these tenders drew bids with lower tariffs at between 7 and 8 cents, the participation was weak, and the government secured deals for only about 900MW. If these bidders prove competent, their project may come online in 2028 or later but not before.

Cancelling the 31 deals was a costly mistake. Bangladesh remains far behind its renewable energy targets. The more energy it imports, the more vulnerable it becomes to global market volatility, geopolitical conflict, and foreign currency depletion. Building renewable capacity is essential for long-term energy security.

Renegotiation was better

Instead of outright cancellation, the Yunus government could have renegotiated the bids for these 31 projects.

Dozens of bidders told TBS in 2024 that the tariff offered by these solar projects ranges between 9.7 cents and 10.6 cents per kilowatt hour. These offers were made more than a year ago during which time solar modules price dropped by 20%. Since solar modules account for 35% of the project costs, the government could have renegotiated tariffs down by at least 1 cent and up to 1.5 cents bringing them into the 8-9 cents range.

The Yunus government also significantly reduced import duties on solar panels to 1% for the 2025-26 fiscal year to promote renewable energy. Additionally, a 10-year tax holiday (100% for 5 years, then 50% for 3, 25% for 2) is available for eligible renewable energy projects, with proposals to exempt VAT and stamp duty.

This prompted some of the cancelled bidders to offer even more cuts in their tariffs. But the government did not respond, a couple of bidders said.

Solar module prices decline almost every year globally. This was confirmed when the bids in 2025 under the Yunus government came in at 7-8 cents.

These 31 cancelled projects could have replaced $820 million worth of fossil fuel imports while providing direct jobs to 10,000 people.

Bangladesh had set a target of generating 15% of its electricity from renewable resources by 2030 and 40% by 2040. Yet, current achievements hover around just 3%.

Cancelling projects is easy because it requires doing nothing. But prudently executing them demands foresight, effort, and the intellectual capacity to secure the nation's future.

After the interim government took over, Ahsan Mansur was perhaps one of the few people who carried out some substantial and visible work. Those of us who closely observed and evaluated his actions tend to agree on one point: during the interim period, the economic sector was the only area where meaningful steps were taken. Compared to other sectors, this one saw concrete reform initiatives, particularly from the central bank.

If we look at the record, significant reforms were introduced in the banking sector. Changes were made to the boards of directors of several banks, and restructuring efforts began. The exchange rate situation improved, foreign reserves showed signs of recovery, and remittance inflows increased. These are not minor developments. I would suggest that during Dr Ahsan H Mansur's tenure, the economic sector experienced notable progress.

That said, it is also true that despite his goodwill and intentions, some reforms could not be completed.
For example, we cannot claim that full monetary discipline was established. Nor can we say that a strong structure of accountability, transparency, and responsibility was fully institutionalised. Still, leaving those limitations aside, I would argue that his tenure left behind considerable achievements.

Now, the question is why he had to leave so abruptly. When a political government is elected, it certainly has the authority to appoint a new governor. It can reshuffle ministries and bring in people it considers more suitable or capable. That is not unusual. What surprised many of us, however, was the manner in which Dr Mansur's departure took place.

As far as we know, he did not receive a formal termination letter. He reportedly learned about his removal through news channels. To me, this indicates that proper institutional due process was not followed. When he left, there was agitation among central bank staff, and he had to leave amid that unrest.

A newly elected government has every right to bring in new leadership, but there is also a matter of institutional etiquette. A proper and respectful transition would have reflected better on the system.

If we think about the monetary and banking reforms initiated during this period, important groundwork has been laid. Discussions had also begun on recovering embezzled funds that were laundered abroad. These were serious steps.

I would like to highlight three concerns about what might happen in his absence.

First, regarding reforms: Many of the recent monetary and financial reforms were undertaken on our own initiative. In the past, such reforms often came in response to directives from institutions like the IMF. This time, however, there was an effort to act proactively. Don't we want a financial sector that operates under a proper system? Don't we want transparency and accountability? Don't we want structural changes that strengthen the sector? Of course we do. These reforms had begun to move in that direction, and many of us appreciated that.

Second, we now have a newly elected government with many pressing political priorities. There are pending bills left by the interim administration, the referendum issue, implementation of the July Charter, and several other political commitments.

My concern is how high financial sector reform will rank among these priorities. There is always the possibility that some regulatory frameworks could be rolled back. Much will depend on how seriously the new government chooses to prioritise economic and financial reform.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, just before the interim government's tenure ended, the issue of granting full autonomy to Bangladesh Bank resurfaced. Dr Mansur raised the matter and placed it before the interim administration, leaving it for consideration by the newly elected government.

The future of many reforms depends heavily on this question of autonomy. Without real independence, the central bank risks functioning more as a department of the finance ministry rather than as the state's monetary authority. In such a scenario, vested interests could exert influence, and reform efforts could stall.

Ultimately, the future of banking and monetary reform in Bangladesh will depend largely on whether the central bank is allowed to operate as a truly autonomous institution. Without that foundation, sustaining meaningful reform will be extremely difficult.

Selim Jahan is a Professorial Fellow at the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development.