Eight years ago on 22 March, Dhaka erupted in celebration. A colourful procession rolled out from Doyel Chattar, festooned with banners and buoyed by orchestra music. Balloons were released at Dhaka University.

Back then, LDC graduation was framed as a national triumph, a validation of governance, and, crucially, a legacy project of the now-ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

Today, that narrative is unravelling.

A newly released UN Graduation Readiness Assessment tells a far more sobering story: Bangladesh may have met the formal thresholds to graduate from the Least Developed Country category, but it remains structurally unprepared for what comes next.

And that distinction between eligibility and readiness is now at the heart of a critical policy reversal as the current government is looking to defer the graduation.

The illusion of readiness

The United Nations has long emphasised a simple but often ignored principle that graduating from LDC status is not just about crossing statistical thresholds. It is about ensuring that development gains are not reversed once international support mechanisms are withdrawn.

By that standard, Bangladesh's preparedness is deeply questionable.

The assessment identifies four core vulnerabilities that continue to define the economy: dependence on international support measures, weak trade diversification, limited domestic resource mobilisation, and acute exposure to climate risks.

Take domestic resource mobilisation for instance. Bangladesh's tax-to-GDP ratio remains among the lowest globally, severely limiting fiscal space. Even medium-term targets fall short of what is required for a lower-middle-income economy.

In practical terms, this means the state lacks the capacity to absorb shocks — whether from the loss of trade preferences, reduced concessional financing, or external volatility. And the economy is yet to recover from the turbulence it faced from 2022 to 2025.

The report states that weak revenue mobilisation is "one of the most binding preparedness gaps" in Bangladesh's transition.

A narrow economy in a changing world

If fiscal weakness is one pillar of vulnerability, export concentration is another.

Bangladesh's export success has been built overwhelmingly on a single sector — ready-made garments. Apparel accounts for over 80% of merchandise exports, with limited diversification even within the sector itself.

This model worked under LDC conditions, where preferential market access and policy flexibilities provided a cushion. But post-graduation, that cushion disappears.

The UN assessment warns that Bangladesh remains "anchored in a narrow export base and limited industrial upgrading", with low value addition and constrained pathways for diversification.

Upon graduation, preference erosion could translate into billions in lost exports, eroding competitiveness at a time when global markets are already tightening.

Economic growth specialist and COO of Rancon Infrastructure and Engineering Subail Bin Alam's assessment captures this risk with precision.

"For too long, the RMG sector has been our safety net, accounting for over 80% of our exports. However, the 'LDC Graduation' means we are about to lose Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) benefits, which could result in an estimated $8 billion in annual export losses. Beyond apparel, the export basket is dominated by low-complexity products, reflecting a pronounced capability gap and limited scope for adjacent diversification," he explained.

In other words, Bangladesh is attempting to graduate with an economic structure that still resembles that of an LDC.

A preparatory period lost to crisis

If the structural weaknesses are longstanding, the failure of preparation is more recent — and more damning.

The five-year preparatory period, granted by the UN to ensure a smooth transition, was meant to be a time of reform, coordination, and strategic planning. Instead, it became a period of crisis management.

The UN report notes that the past five years were "largely consumed by crisis management, economic stabilisation and political survival," rather than long-term preparation.

This is consistent with the government's own admission. In its letter to the UN Committee for Development Policy, Bangladesh acknowledged that the preparatory period "has not functioned as intended".

Global shocks played a role — the Covid-19 pandemic, the Ukraine war, tightening financial conditions. But domestic factors were equally significant: financial sector irregularities, policy rigidity, and ultimately, the political upheaval of August 2024.

The result is an economy entering 2026 with depleted reserves, high inflation, weak investment, and limited fiscal space.

As applied macroeconomist and Director of Sydney Policy Analysis Centre Jyoti Rahman puts it, "The economic landscape has been severely battered. Honestly, from an external perspective, it is clear the economy is caught in a long-term entanglement. We saw a total stagnation of private investment throughout 2025 following the July Uprising. We have entered 2026 facing deep economic uncertainty, exacerbated by global conflicts and an acute energy crisis."

He adds a crucial point, "The transition from LDC status is an inevitable and necessary milestone. However, the true challenge lies in our preparation."

That preparation, by most accounts, has been inadequate.

The cost of policy hubris

In retrospect, the problem was not the ambition to graduate. It was the politicisation of that ambition.

Under the previous Awami regime, LDC graduation was framed less as a technical process and more as a symbolic victory. The 2018 celebrations were not an isolated event — they reflected a broader narrative that equated eligibility with readiness.

That narrative discouraged caution.

"For too long, the RMG sector has been our safety net, accounting for over 80% of our exports. However, the 'LDC Graduation' means we are about to lose Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) benefits, which could result in an estimated $8 billion in annual export losses. Beyond apparel, the export basket is dominated by low-complexity products, reflecting a pronounced capability gap and limited scope for adjacent diversification."
Subail Bin Alam, economic growth specialist and COO, Rancon Infrastructure and Engineering

Economists, business leaders, and development practitioners had, for years, urged a more measured approach. After the Covid-19 shock and the 2022 dollar crisis, calls for deferral grew louder.

Yet these concerns were largely ignored.

When Bangladesh government finally requested 3 years deferral for LDC graduation in February, 2026, Dr Fahmida Khatun, the Executive Director of Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) told TBS, "In the international arena, such decisions of time extensions are not driven by emotion or political rhetoric, but rather based strictly on data, statistics, and measurable indicators."

The data, it now appears, was pointing in a different direction all along.

Why deferral makes economic sense

Against this backdrop, the current government's decision to seek a three-year deferral is a necessary recalibration. Especially given the looming economic crisis due to the ongoing Iran War.

First, time is needed to negotiate post-LDC trade arrangements.

BGMEA President Mahmudul Hasan Khan said, "New trade opportunities — such as Free Trade Agreements, Preferential Trade Agreements or Economic Partnership Agreements — may open up. But these agreements do not materialise overnight. They require careful preparation, technical analysis, and lengthy negotiations. If rushed, there is a risk of securing unfavourable terms or overlooking key national interests."

At the same time, macroeconomic stability must be restored.

Jyoti Rahman explained, "In the immediate term, the government's primary duty is to maintain macroeconomic stability. It is about managed stability rather than just obsessing over the absolute reserve figure."

Moreover, structural reforms must be accelerated — particularly in taxation, banking, and the investment climate. As Subail Bin Alam cautioned, "When banks are burdened by bad debt, they stop lending to the 'missing middle', the SMEs. We cannot build a modern economy if our entrepreneurs are forced to borrow at 14–16% interest rates while competing against global players who have access to capital at 4–5%."

The consequences of proceeding without adequate preparation are not hypothetical.

Loss of trade preferences could erode export competitiveness. Reduced concessional financing could strain public finances. Withdrawal of policy flexibilities could limit industrial policy options.

The UN assessment points out that these risks are compounded by Bangladesh's continued reliance on LDC-specific support measures and limited institutional capacity to manage their withdrawal.

In short, the country risks losing the benefits of LDC status before it has built the resilience required to operate without them.

This is why the report warns that graduation, under current conditions, could "disrupt development gains".

That is not a risk any responsible government should take.

What must be done next

Deferral, however, is not a solution in itself. It is an opportunity — one that must be used wisely. Over the years, the experts have pointed out the priorities. Now the necessary measures need to be taken to increase our preparedness.

"At this juncture, we need more than just a budget; we need a detailed roadmap. The government should use the upcoming budget to outline exactly how they plan to achieve their long-term growth targets," Jyoti Rahman said.

However the Awami regime portrayed it, LDC graduation was never meant to be a trophy. It was meant to be a transition. For too long, that distinction was blurred.

Today, the reality is unavoidable: Bangladesh is not yet ready to graduate in a way that is smooth, sustainable, and irreversible. The data says so. The experts say so. Even the government, implicitly, acknowledges it.

And in policymaking, that is often the hardest and most necessary step.

Shadique Mahbub Islam is a journalist.

Picture this: Dhaka, 9 February 2026. Three days before a national election, in a room sealed from public scrutiny, officials sign the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) with the United States.

No parliamentary debate. No press conference. No disclosure of terms.

Twenty-four hundred kilometres west, in New Delhi, textile exporters scan the leaked fine prints. Their conclusion: Bangladesh has locked itself into buying expensive American cotton in exchange for tariff access. Production costs will rise. Profit margins will shrink.

But the real story runs deeper.

Article 4.3 contains a sleeper clause: if Bangladesh signs any agreement with a "non-market-based country" — Washington's shorthand for China or Russia — the US can cancel all preferences overnight.

Bangladesh commits to supporting US actions to protect American economic security. Dhaka agrees to restrict the unauthorised exports of US-controlled items and develop export control systems with Washington.

This is not a trade agreement. This is a strategic straitjacket, tailored in the 12 days before an election, while the nation looked away.

The missing filter

Hossain Zillur Rahman's six-point memo to the new government is essential reading — a sharp domestic diagnostic on jobless growth, mesoeconomics, and effective compassion. He is right about the internal fractures. But the world outside has fractured too.

The global economy is no longer neutral. It has become a battlefield. Western economic warfare, supply chain decoupling, and the rise of a multipolar world have transformed every major economic decision into a geopolitical choice. A power plant is not just megawatts. A 5G contract is not just bandwidth. A trade deal is not just tariffs.

Bangladesh needs a seventh signal: a dual-filter framework embedded into governance. Every decision on export diversification, energy security, and digital infrastructure must pass two tests.

First, does it advance domestic economic goals? This is Rahman's framework.

Second, does it increase or decrease our strategic vulnerability in a fracturing world? This is the missing framework, and without it, competence alone will not steer us through the storm.

The 9 February deal through both filters

Apply this dual filter to the US-Bangladesh ART agreement.

Through the first lens, the deal offers duty-free access for approximately 2,500 products. Export volumes to the United States could rise from $8.7 billion to $12 billion within two years. On paper, this deal appears to advance national interests.

The second lens reveals a straitjacket. Tariff-rate quota volumes for apparel will be determined by US textile imports. Garments made using Indian, Brazilian or African cotton may not qualify for preferential access. Bangladesh's entire apparel value chain must pivot toward higher-cost US inputs.

Worse, sovereignty clauses restrict future foreign policy. Sign an agreement with Beijing that Washington deems harmful? The deal terminates. Purchase nuclear reactors from Russia or China? Explicitly prohibited. Pursue digital cooperation with non-Western partners? Restricted.

The agreement also locks Dhaka into purchasing $15 billion of American Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) over 15 years, plus commitments to buy 14 Boeing aircraft — a $3-4 billion decision made without consulting Biman's technical committee, which was still evaluating competing proposals from Airbus.

This is not economic policy. It is surrendering fiscal sovereignty.

Bangladesh needs a seventh signal: a dual-filter framework embedded into governance. Every decision on export diversification, energy security and digital infrastructure must pass two tests: first, does it advance domestic economic goals, and second, does it increase or decrease our strategic vulnerability in a fracturing world?

Export diversification beyond the cotton trap

Bangladesh's export basket remains heavily concentrated in a few sectors. Ready-made garments account for over 80% of earnings. Four markets — the European Union, the United States, Canada, and Japan — absorb 68% of exports. This is a single point of failure wrapped in cotton.

The Global South offers alternatives without strategic shackles. In January 2026, Bangladesh Bank announced cash incentives for 43 export categories, including light engineering, halal meat, leather goods, pharmaceuticals, and software-enabled services. The halal economy alone is projected to reach $10 trillion by 2030.

Local currency settlement mechanisms are reducing exposure to dollar volatility across Asia. About 90% of commerce among Brics nations is now settled in local currencies, up from roughly 65% two years ago.

The Brics Pay platform, presented at the October 2024 Kazan Summit, connects national payment systems — China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), India's Unified Payments Interface (UPI), Russia's System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), and Brazil's instant payment network PIX — enabling local-currency transactions via QR codes without intermediaries.

These are operational frameworks Bangladesh can study and adapt.

Energy security as geopolitical choice

Every power plant tells a story about whose technology a nation trusts. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, built with Russian technology, is expected to begin operations this year.

The Matarbari coal plant, developed with Japanese assistance, represents another model. The LNG terminals supplied by US and Qatari partners represent a third. Each carries different strategic implications and different exposure to sanctions.

Bangladesh must prioritise its energy security. The 9 February deal bars Bangladesh from purchasing nuclear reactors, fuel rods or enriched uranium from any country that 'jeopardises essential US interests', offering exceptions only for existing contracts. This is a pre-emptive strike against future energy choices.

In January 2026, the Ministry of Power submitted a 25-year master plan to Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, focusing on offshore gas exploration, LNG supply security, and hydrogen infrastructure. The plan projects electricity demand rising from 17 to 59 gigawatts by 2050, requiring investments exceeding $177 billion. Bangladesh must ensure its energy future remains its own to decide.

Digital infrastructure and data sovereignty

The twenty-first century's most valuable resource is data. The infrastructure that carries it — undersea cables, data centres and cloud platforms — is increasingly contested terrain.

The draft National AI Policy 2026-2030 explicitly emphasises "digital sovereignty", aiming to safeguard critical data and citizens' rights. A cornerstone is the development of a Bangla-based large language model to preserve cultural heritage and protect intellectual property from foreign exploitation.

The policy warns that automation may threaten up to 60.8% of garment sector jobs, affecting around 2.7 million workers.

Yet the 9 February deal commits Bangladesh to "permit the free transfer of data across trusted borders" and support a permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These provisions constrain Dhaka's ability to negotiate different data governance frameworks with other partners.

The emerging cooperation among Asean, China, and Gulf states on digital trade platforms offers an alternative model — built on connectivity rather than control. These frameworks do not require choosing against the West. They require building enough relationships that no single partner can dictate terms.

The seventh signal

Zillur Rahman's six signals provide a strong domestic foundation. But they assume a world that no longer exists. The seventh signal is this: Bangladesh's economic and foreign policy can no longer be separated. Every decision on export markets, energy partners, and digital infrastructure is simultaneously an economic calculation and a geopolitical commitment.

The new government must institutionalise this understanding. Create a National Economic Security Council bringing together trade, finance, energy, and foreign policy officials. Require strategic vulnerability assessments for every major international agreement. Task the central bank with a formal assessment of platforms like Brics Pay — not as alternatives to Western systems, but as complements that ensure the dollar is not the only option.

The choice before the BNP government is not between East and West. The choice is between accepting a straitjacket designed elsewhere and building enough relationships and enough strategic literacy that Bangladesh's future remains Bangladesh's to write.

Hossain Zillur Rahman is right: the start is grounded in optimism. But optimism without strategic clarity is just wishful thinking dressed in the national flag. The seventh signal must come now — before the next agreement is signed in secret, before the next straitjacket is tailored, before the next crossroads becomes a dead end.

Zakir Kibria is a Bangladeshi writer, policy analyst and entrepreneur based in Kathmandu, Nepal.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.

Qatar on Monday suspended its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) production following attacks on key operating facilities by Iran.

This suspension means Bangladesh, which has a long-term agreement with Qatar to supply LNG, will not get its much-needed fuel in this lean season. As a result the country will face heavy load shedding, since a significant portion of its gas-based power generation will not have adequate supply.

Bangladesh is heavily dependent on imported fuels to meet its energy needs. It imports various fuel oil, coal, LNG, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) worth around $5 billion annually because domestic gas and coal resources are very limited.

Lost opportunity

Bangladesh could have fared differently and better had the Yunus-led government not cancelled 31 renewable power projects totalling 3,300 megawatt capacity, mostly solar, with around 300MW wind and a small 25MW waste-to-energy project.

By now, around one third of these projects could have been generating electricity, reducing the impact of load shedding caused by impending LNG supply shortfall.

However, they were cancelled in September 2024, just one month after Muhammad Yunus assumed office. The government argued that these projects, signed under the Awami League through the controversial Quick Energy Supply (Special Provision) Act 2010, had not been awarded through competitive bidding.

The power tariffs under these projects ranged between 9.7 cents and 10.6 cents per kilowatt hour. The Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) and the investors criticised the cancellation, and the government's decision was challenged at the High Court. The court ruled that the projects had been signed in good faith and could therefore be condoned with a review option.

With Letters of Intent (LoIs), the power companies had already purchased or were in the process of purchasing lands for their projects. Land acquisition is the most difficult part for any such ventures.

Costly mistake

When companies were expecting final agreements, the then-energy adviser Fouzul Kabir Khan pushed for the cancellation of all LoIs. The government subsequently floated fresh tenders for renewable projects totalling more than 5,000MW.

Although these tenders drew bids with lower tariffs at between 7 and 8 cents, the participation was weak, and the government secured deals for only about 900MW. If these bidders prove competent, their project may come online in 2028 or later but not before.

Cancelling the 31 deals was a costly mistake. Bangladesh remains far behind its renewable energy targets. The more energy it imports, the more vulnerable it becomes to global market volatility, geopolitical conflict, and foreign currency depletion. Building renewable capacity is essential for long-term energy security.

Renegotiation was better

Instead of outright cancellation, the Yunus government could have renegotiated the bids for these 31 projects.

Dozens of bidders told TBS in 2024 that the tariff offered by these solar projects ranges between 9.7 cents and 10.6 cents per kilowatt hour. These offers were made more than a year ago during which time solar modules price dropped by 20%. Since solar modules account for 35% of the project costs, the government could have renegotiated tariffs down by at least 1 cent and up to 1.5 cents bringing them into the 8-9 cents range.

The Yunus government also significantly reduced import duties on solar panels to 1% for the 2025-26 fiscal year to promote renewable energy. Additionally, a 10-year tax holiday (100% for 5 years, then 50% for 3, 25% for 2) is available for eligible renewable energy projects, with proposals to exempt VAT and stamp duty.

This prompted some of the cancelled bidders to offer even more cuts in their tariffs. But the government did not respond, a couple of bidders said.

Solar module prices decline almost every year globally. This was confirmed when the bids in 2025 under the Yunus government came in at 7-8 cents.

These 31 cancelled projects could have replaced $820 million worth of fossil fuel imports while providing direct jobs to 10,000 people.

Bangladesh had set a target of generating 15% of its electricity from renewable resources by 2030 and 40% by 2040. Yet, current achievements hover around just 3%.

Cancelling projects is easy because it requires doing nothing. But prudently executing them demands foresight, effort, and the intellectual capacity to secure the nation's future.

After the interim government took over, Ahsan Mansur was perhaps one of the few people who carried out some substantial and visible work. Those of us who closely observed and evaluated his actions tend to agree on one point: during the interim period, the economic sector was the only area where meaningful steps were taken. Compared to other sectors, this one saw concrete reform initiatives, particularly from the central bank.

If we look at the record, significant reforms were introduced in the banking sector. Changes were made to the boards of directors of several banks, and restructuring efforts began. The exchange rate situation improved, foreign reserves showed signs of recovery, and remittance inflows increased. These are not minor developments. I would suggest that during Dr Ahsan H Mansur's tenure, the economic sector experienced notable progress.

That said, it is also true that despite his goodwill and intentions, some reforms could not be completed.
For example, we cannot claim that full monetary discipline was established. Nor can we say that a strong structure of accountability, transparency, and responsibility was fully institutionalised. Still, leaving those limitations aside, I would argue that his tenure left behind considerable achievements.

Now, the question is why he had to leave so abruptly. When a political government is elected, it certainly has the authority to appoint a new governor. It can reshuffle ministries and bring in people it considers more suitable or capable. That is not unusual. What surprised many of us, however, was the manner in which Dr Mansur's departure took place.

As far as we know, he did not receive a formal termination letter. He reportedly learned about his removal through news channels. To me, this indicates that proper institutional due process was not followed. When he left, there was agitation among central bank staff, and he had to leave amid that unrest.

A newly elected government has every right to bring in new leadership, but there is also a matter of institutional etiquette. A proper and respectful transition would have reflected better on the system.

If we think about the monetary and banking reforms initiated during this period, important groundwork has been laid. Discussions had also begun on recovering embezzled funds that were laundered abroad. These were serious steps.

I would like to highlight three concerns about what might happen in his absence.

First, regarding reforms: Many of the recent monetary and financial reforms were undertaken on our own initiative. In the past, such reforms often came in response to directives from institutions like the IMF. This time, however, there was an effort to act proactively. Don't we want a financial sector that operates under a proper system? Don't we want transparency and accountability? Don't we want structural changes that strengthen the sector? Of course we do. These reforms had begun to move in that direction, and many of us appreciated that.

Second, we now have a newly elected government with many pressing political priorities. There are pending bills left by the interim administration, the referendum issue, implementation of the July Charter, and several other political commitments.

My concern is how high financial sector reform will rank among these priorities. There is always the possibility that some regulatory frameworks could be rolled back. Much will depend on how seriously the new government chooses to prioritise economic and financial reform.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, just before the interim government's tenure ended, the issue of granting full autonomy to Bangladesh Bank resurfaced. Dr Mansur raised the matter and placed it before the interim administration, leaving it for consideration by the newly elected government.

The future of many reforms depends heavily on this question of autonomy. Without real independence, the central bank risks functioning more as a department of the finance ministry rather than as the state's monetary authority. In such a scenario, vested interests could exert influence, and reform efforts could stall.

Ultimately, the future of banking and monetary reform in Bangladesh will depend largely on whether the central bank is allowed to operate as a truly autonomous institution. Without that foundation, sustaining meaningful reform will be extremely difficult.

Selim Jahan is a Professorial Fellow at the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development.

The ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States limiting President Donald Trump's use of emergency powers to impose sweeping tariffs should modestly ease policy uncertainty for Bangladesh's apparel exporters.

Bangladesh had been subject to a 19% "reciprocal" tariff under the recent US-Bangladesh trade arrangement, so the invalidation of those IEEPA-based duties reduces the risk of sudden, across-the-board tariff hikes imposed under emergency authority.

For Bangladesh's garment sector - highly dependent on the US market - predictability is almost as important as the tariff rate itself.

Although Trump has announced a new 10% global tariff under a different legal provision, its uniform application across countries effectively restores a more level playing field in the short term, compared to the differentiated reciprocal regime.

In terms of immediate order flows, I would not expect a sharp spike right away. US buyers typically place apparel orders months in advance, and sourcing strategies are shaped by longer-term considerations related to cost, compliance, and logistics.

However, the court decision could improve buyer sentiment by reducing legal uncertainty and the prospect of retroactive duties. Some American retailers may briefly pause to assess the evolving policy environment, especially given Trump's signal that he intends to pursue tariffs under alternative legal authorities.

If the new 10% tariff proves more stable and predictable than the earlier emergency-based regime, it could gradually support steadier order volumes from US importers.

However, I am concerned that a new set of restrictive trade measures from the US administration may be forthcoming, which could continue to disrupt the global trading system.

In this context, the hastily concluded trade agreement between Bangladesh and the United States - signed by the interim government just days before the national election - is already being questioned. Under this agreement, Bangladesh's interests appear to be significantly underrepresented. Moreover, the future of the agreement remains uncertain in light of the evolving legal and policy landscape.

On competitiveness, Bangladesh could see a relative advantage if higher country-specific tariffs on major competitors - particularly China - remain constrained or face legal scrutiny.

If the tariff gap between Bangladesh and higher-cost suppliers widens or becomes more predictable, US brands may accelerate diversification toward Bangladeshi factories.

However, competitiveness will still hinge on productivity, lead times, compliance standards, and infrastructure - not just tariffs.

In the bigger picture, the ruling reinforces constitutional limits on executive trade authority, which may lead to more congressional involvement in future tariff decisions.

For Bangladesh, a more rules-based US trade environment would likely be preferable to abrupt, executive-driven shifts.

Dr Selim Raihan is the executive director of the South Asian Network on Economic Modelling (Sanem).

The Supreme Court's recent ruling has altered the economic foundation of Bangladesh's trade arrangement with the United States. The reciprocal tariff mechanism that once justified a set of demanding obligations has been struck down. The administration has responded with a temporary 10% global tariff that applies to all countries alike. By statute, this tariff can remain in place for no more than 150 days unless Congress authorises an extension.

As a result, the tariff burden tied to the bilateral deal has fallen sharply. It is natural to ask why we should continue to carry obligations that were tied to a benefit that no longer exists in the same form. The instinct to demand renegotiation is understandable, and the desire for fairness is real. But the moment calls for clear judgment.

The case for patience
When circumstances shift abruptly, the impulse is to act quickly. Yet this is precisely when restraint becomes a strategic asset. The United States is navigating a politically sensitive moment: a legal setback, a hurried policy adjustment, and an uncertain path forward. Pressing for renegotiation now risks being seen as taking advantage of a partner at a vulnerable moment. That perception, even if unintended, can trigger reactions that are not strictly economic — regulatory scrutiny, administrative slowdowns, and other measures that fall outside the tariff framework. These tools remain fully available to Washington today.

Equally important is the uncertainty surrounding the status of the bilateral deal itself. The Supreme Court ruling removed the tariff instrument, but it did not automatically void the agreement. The obligations Bangladesh accepted do not rest on the same legal foundation as the reciprocal tariff. Assuming the deal has collapsed would be a serious misreading of the situation. Such an assumption could lead to missteps — provoking confrontation or relaxing compliance too soon. Until the United States clarifies its position, Bangladesh must proceed on the basis that the deal remains in force, even if its economic logic has weakened.

There is also a more structural risk that must be acknowledged. Bangladesh could find itself placed under the "unfair trade practices" category, a designation that allows the United States to impose tariffs under a different statute — tariffs that can reach levels far higher than the current 10%. Bangladesh is exposed on several fronts — labour standards, environmental compliance, and supply-chain transparency. None of these issues are new, but in a tense political climate they can be invoked to justify punitive measures. This is not a reason to retreat from seeking a fairer deal; it is a reason to choose the moment carefully.

Bangladesh can reduce its exposure with steady, practical steps. Strengthening labour-inspection systems, improving documentation of workplace conditions, and ensuring credible third-party verification of compliance would help close the gaps that often invite scrutiny. Environmental reporting can be made more transparent, especially in sectors where buyers already demand traceability. And coordination with industry to maintain consistent standards across factories would make it harder for isolated lapses to be framed as systemic failures. None of this guarantees immunity, but it places Bangladesh on firmer ground if allegations arise.

A better moment will come

The broader strategic logic still favours patience. When the environment is unsettled, the value of time increases. The United States will need to rebuild its trade architecture in the wake of the ruling. It will have to decide whether to craft new bilateral arrangements, adjust the temporary tariff, or seek congressional authority for a more durable framework. In that period, Bangladesh will not be approaching a wounded partner but engaging one ready to redesign. That is when our voice will carry more weight, and our demands will be seen as part of a forward-looking conversation rather than a reaction to a moment of weakness.

Bangladesh should prepare its position now — identify which clauses are unacceptable, articulate the imbalance created by the new tariff reality, and build a coherent case for a fairer arrangement. But preparation is not the same as provocation. The wiser course is to maintain a calm, neutral posture while the United States clarifies its next steps.

When Washington begins shaping its post-ruling trade strategy, Bangladesh can then make a principled, confident case for revisiting the terms. At that moment, renegotiation will not be an act of pressure but an act of alignment.

The public's desire for a fairer deal is legitimate. The government is right to prepare for one. But the country will gain more by choosing the right moment than the loudest one. The cost of moving too early is far greater than the cost of waiting. Bangladesh must choose timing over impulse — leverage over noise.

Zahid Hussain is a former lead economist of The World Bank, Dhaka Office

With 209 seats on its own and an expected 212-seat bloc with allies, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has secured a decisive parliamentary majority. Voter turnout stood at 59.44%, and the Election Commission's announcement of results has formally closed a chapter of political uncertainty.

For the business community, that certainty matters.

But economists caution that electoral legitimacy, while necessary, is not sufficient to restore macroeconomic momentum. 

The new government inherits slowing private investment, persistent inflationary pressures, a stressed banking sector and a weak revenue base. The mandate is clear. The economic road ahead is less so.

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From uncertainty to confidence

Professor Mustafizur Rahman, Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), describes the election outcome as a "necessary condition" for recovery — but not a guarantee.

 
"A peaceful and credible election has removed uncertainty and marked the beginning of a renewed democratic journey — an undeniably positive signal for the country's trade, commerce and overall economy. This was a necessary condition for boosting investment, as the private sector was reluctant to undertake new investments or expand existing businesses amid prolonged uncertainty," he said. 

"However, a credible election alone is not sufficient to inject dynamism into the economy or to rebuild investor confidence. To translate this political development into tangible investment outcomes, several additional enabling factors must be addressed. Most important among them are improvements in law and order and the assurance of good governance," Mustafizur added. 

 
At the same time, appropriate fiscal policy must be pursued. The ease of doing business needs to be enhanced, and the cost of doing business reduced. Necessary reforms across key economic sectors must be implemented, institutional efficiency strengthened, and overall macroeconomic stability ensured.

 
If these measures are put in place, confidence among both domestic and foreign investors will grow, leading to higher investment flows, the economist noted.

Mustafizur cautioned, "Investment will not surge from day one simply because these steps are initiated. However, they will send a strong positive signal to the market. As confidence gradually strengthens, investment will follow."

 
The emphasis is clear: Political stability must now translate into administrative predictability. For investors, law and order is not merely a security issue — it is a cost variable. Contract enforcement, customs clearance, dispute resolution and regulatory consistency all shape capital allocation decisions.

The first 100 days: Credibility on the line

For Jyoti Rahman, director of International Affairs at the Sydney Policy Analysis Center, the government's early actions will define its economic trajectory.

Ramadan is approaching — historically a period when prices of essential commodities rise. That seasonal inflation will be the administration's first credibility test.

"When a new government takes office, if it fails to immediately build confidence and credibility, that failure will have downstream effects later on."

He added, "Now consider the current moment. If the BNP government comes to power just as Ramadan begins — or right before it, since Ramadan is set to start next Wednesday or Thursday — we face a familiar and unfortunate pattern in Bangladesh: prices of essential commodities tend to rise during Ramadan. It may be onions, eggplants, or other staples. We have seen this before. Sheikh Hasina once even dismissed public concern by suggesting that people could simply avoid eating onions or eggplants. Such remarks damaged public trust.

"If the new government cannot manage the supply chain from day one, the impact on confidence and credibility will be severe. That erosion of trust will hurt the government later when it confronts larger macroeconomic challenges. As a macroeconomist, what I expect from the new government is clear: it must take supply chain management very seriously as an immediate confidence-building measure. In the long run, credibility is everything," Jyoti further said.

Second, he added, the budget is obviously critical. The interim government essentially operated with an interim framework — it did not introduce major new programmes or projects but simply kept things running.

"The new government, however, must now manage the debt legacy left behind by Hasina."  

At the same time, the new government must fulfil its campaign promises — the mandate it received from voters. So it faces a threefold challenge: servicing past debt, delivering on electoral commitments, and maintaining a sustainable fiscal framework. This will be extremely difficult. The budget is not merely a technical exercise; it is a strategic priority that requires strong communication with the public.

"Third, the government must articulate a long-term development plan. We speak of becoming a $3,000-per-capita economy, but sustaining that level requires around 10% growth and structural reform. What is the mission? What is the long-term strategy? These questions must be addressed now," Jyoti Rahman said. "The upcoming budget will therefore be more than a financial statement — it will be a declaration of intent."

The revenue question

That intent, economists argue, must include deep institutional reform — starting with the National Board of Revenue (NBR).

Zaidi Sattar, chairman of the Policy Research Institute (PRI), is blunt in his assessment, "One of the major obstacles to Bangladesh's economic progress is the institution known as the National Board of Revenue. If the new government genuinely wants to advance economic development, this institution must be thoroughly overhauled and restructured."

Reforming the NBR could unlock significant benefits for the economy. In many ways, it is the key to growth and progress. If this key is not turned properly, the entire system remains stuck. This is not a minor issue — it is a serious structural bottleneck.

He said, "In my view, the NBR is one of the most critical institutional stumbling blocks to Bangladesh's economic advancement. It must therefore be treated with the highest level of priority. Comprehensive reform — administrative, structural and governance-related — is essential if the country is to achieve sustained and inclusive economic growth."

Bangladesh's tax-to-GDP ratio remains persistently low. A narrow tax base and complex compliance regime discourage formalisation. Without reform, fiscal space will remain constrained — limiting infrastructure spending, social protection and debt management capacity.

For a government seeking to move the economy towards higher-middle-income status, revenue reform is not optional, he said.

Lessons from the past

Economists also underline what the new administration must avoid. Jyoti Rahman outlined it neatly.

"First, macroeconomic orthodoxy must be restored and protected. Political interference in banking supervision and directed lending under previous administrations weakened financial discipline. Depoliticising the banking sector and strengthening regulatory autonomy are critical," he said.

He added, "Second, fiscal populism carries risks. Large-scale projects without transparent cost-benefit analysis strain public finances and crowd out private investment.

"Third, inequality must be addressed through opportunity creation, not merely redistribution. Expanding transfer programmes without improving labour productivity, education quality and SME access to finance risks entrenching dependency rather than growth," he added.

"Finally, communication matters," he said, "Markets respond not only to policy but to signalling. Transparent engagement with the business community and development partners can anchor expectations and reduce volatility."

A narrow but decisive window

The election has delivered a stable parliamentary arithmetic. But stability must now be converted into reform momentum.

The priorities, economists agree, are immediate supply stabilisation, law and order improvements, credible budgeting, NBR reform and banking sector discipline. None are politically easy. All are economically necessary.

Investment will not surge overnight. Growth will not rebound instantly. But early, coherent steps can reset expectations. The mandate is strong. The structural constraints are real. Whether the new government can bridge the two will define Bangladesh's next economic chapter.